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Superstars are not by accident a conspicuous phenomenon in our culture, but inherently
belong to a meritocratic society with mass media, free enterprise, and competition. To make
this contention plausible I will use Caillois’s book, Man, Play and Games,
1 to compare the
mechanisms underlying the superstar phenomenon with a special kind of game, as set
out by Caillois. As far as I know, Caillois’s book is not quoted in the literature dealing with
income distribution theories, although the comparison with play and games is, for limited
purposes, interesting. In play and games we ﬁnd almost all elements which play a role in
theories of just income distribution: equality of opportunity, chance, talent, competition
and skill, reward, entitlement, winners and losers, etc. These are not chance similarities,
for “. . . games are largely dependent upon the cultures in which they are practised. They
affect their preferences, prolong their customs, and reﬂect their beliefs . . . One ...c a n
. . . posit a truly reciprocal relationship between a society and the games it likes to play”.
2
Moreover, as we will see, superstars combine the four basic characteristics of play that
make their activities a special kind of play.
Play or work
Johan Huizinga,
3 cited by Caillois, considers play as an activity which is not serious (that
is, standing outside ordinary life), with no material interest and where no proﬁt can be
gained. Caillois disputes Huizinga’s belief that in games no material interests are involved.
He sees this belief as a result of Huizinga’s restriction of his analysis to competitive
games, and the consequent omission of games of chance. Still, Caillois afﬁrms that in
play or games of chance in general “Property is exchanged, but no goods are produced ...
A characteristic of play, in fact, is that it creates no wealth or goods, thus differing from
work or art”.
4 If we want to relate superstars in sport with Caillois’s analysis of play and
games, then we seem to have a problem: the commerce of sport and athletes’ high annual
incomes can be considered as earnings or rewards for services rendered by them in the
form of games. However, if the game produces no goods (or wealth), then professionals
or superstars sports do not play, as amateurs do, but work. Indeed, following this logic,
Caillois asserts that: “As for the professionals . . . it is clear that they are not players but
workers. When they play, it is at some other game.”
5
The question is whether an external element, like monetary rewards for the players,
changes our characterization of an activity: it is no longer play but work. Should an
activity performed by amateurs be reckoned as play, while the same activity performed
by professionals be reckoned as work? As Caillois remarks elsewhere, the intrusion ofLoek Groot
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reality (i.e. money) in play brings along the possibility of the corruption of play (like
bribery, drugs, etc.), but the game itself remains intact: “The nature of competition or the
performance is hardly modiﬁed if the athletes or comedians are professionals who play
for money rather than amateurs who play for pleasure. The difference concerns only the
players”.
6 If the difference concerns only the players, then it cannot concern the play. For
the outside spectator, both amateur and professional sports will be seen as play (despite
the fact than the professionals are at work): when watching sports, we, the audience,
do not have the feeling that we see hard workers rather than fanatic players. This is why
we have to go one step further than Caillois did in criticizing Huizinga: in play not only
is property exchanged (as happens in games of chance), but goods or services are also
produced. We can consider professional sports as play only if we drop Caillois’s assertion
that by deﬁnition in play no wealth or goods are produced.
Classiﬁcation and characterization of plays
Caillois distinguishes four categories of play:
I am proposing a division into four main rubrics, depending upon whether, in the games under
consideration, the role of competition, chance, simulation, or vertigo is dominant. I call these
agôn, alea, mimicry, and ilinx, respectively. . .  One plays football, billiards, or chess (agôn); roulette
or a lottery (alea); pirate, Nero, or Hamlet (mimicry); or one produces in oneself, by a rapid
whirling or falling movement, a state of dizziness and disorder (ilinx).
7
Each category can furthermore be situated between the two poles of paidia and ludus.
Paidia is the indulging in and giving free rein to uncontrolled fantasies, free improvisa-
tion, and turbulence. Ludus is the inverse tendency which keeps paidia in check by setting
up arbitrary rules. In Caillois’s framework, ludus must be seen as the necessary comple-
ment to, and reﬁnement of, paidia, where the energy present in paidia can be transformed
by means of the rules of the game to a puriﬁed and excellent activity:
Such a primary power of improvisation and joy, which I call paidia, is allied to the taste for
gratuitous difﬁculty that I propose to call ludus, in order to encompass the various games
to which, without exaggeration, a civilizing quality can be attributed. In fact, they reﬂect
the moral and intellectual values of a culture, as well as contribute to their reﬁnement and
development.
8
So the distinction paidia-ludus deals with the degree of institutionalization of the game,
whilst the classiﬁcation into four categories reﬂect the kind of play and, not unimportantly,
the psychological attitude of the players.
9
According to Caillois, two pairs, agôn-alea and mimicry-vertigo, are exceedingly pro-
ductive and fruitful in terms of shaping and expressing culture. His proposition is that in
primitive societies social cohesion is based on practices linked with the mimicry-vertigo
couple, whereas, for instance, Western civilization (at least since the miracle of ancient
Greece) is dominated by practices refering to the agôn-alea couple:Roger Caillois, Games of Chance and the Superstar
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. . . primitive societies, which I prefer to call “Dionysian”, be they Australian, American, or African,
are societies ruled equally by masks and possession, i.e. by mimicry and ilinx. Conversely, the
Incas, Assyrians, Chinese, or Romans are orderly societies with ofﬁces, careers, codes, and ready-
reckoners, with ﬁxed and hierarchical privileges in which agôn and alea, i.e. merit and heredity,
seem to be the chief complementary elements of the game of living. In contrast to the primitive
societies, these are “rational”. In the ﬁrst type there are simulation and vertigo or pantomime
and ecstasy which assure the intensity and, as a consequence, the cohesion of social life. In the
second type, the social nexus consists of compromise, of an implied reckoning between heredity,
which is a kind of chance, and capacity, which presupposes evaluation and competition.
10
Conﬁning ourselves to the pair, agôn-alea, the productiveness and fruitfulness of this com-
bination lies in a double similarity and a double complementarity. The ﬁrst similarity
concerns the implicit notion of equality of opportunity. In competitive games no starting
point is favoured over an other, and similarly in games of chance each lottery ticket has
an equal chance to win. The second similarity is that both competitive games and games
of chance are strongly bound and regulated by rules (that is, paidia is strongly bound and
regulated by ludus).
Competitive games and games of chance exhibit mutually complementary character-
istics with respect, ﬁrst, to the way the winners of the games are selected and, secondly,
to the way the players behave. In competitive games the winners are selected by means
of demonstrated ability, while by games of chance the winners are assigned by lot. The
second complementarity is strongly connected with this. Players in competitive games
make great efforts and must have conﬁdence in their own capabilities to win, while the
players of games of chance are passive, renouncing their will and submitting to luck.
Now the equality of opportunity or equal starting points, the strong regulation by
rules, the different ways the winners are selected, and the difference between endeavour
and resignation are all elements of daily life. For instance, the importance of equality of
opportunity in daily life is reﬂected in the striving for equality by means of equal access
to schooling and subsequently to employment, effected if necessary through positive
discrimination in favour of minorities (‘afﬁrmative action’). The element of chance refers
to the high degree of contingency in our lives, despite all the social policies which are in
force. Income can be obtained by hard work or by good fortune (inheritance, natural
talent). It would be too long to list all the parallels, but it should be stressed that games
of both the agôn- and the alea-type are the mirror-image of our daily life.
Anticipating the discussion below of the special place of superstars in our society,
we can say that their activities exhibit characteristics of competitive games as well as
of games of chance. The superstar is, so to speak, the epiphenomenon of the agôn-alea
couple. Before elaborating on this, I want to dwell brieﬂy on the relationship between
agôn-elea and the just distribution of income or, rather, on what they share in common,
according to Caillois.
Agon-alea in relation to a just distribution of income
What is the relation of agôn-alea to a just distribution of income? In A Theory of Justice by
Rawls, the moral arbitrariness of talent (the arbitrariness of the distribution of natural
talents among individuals) plays an important role. If the distribution of income does notLoek Groot
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take into account the effects of differences in natural talent (and social assets), it in effect
sanctions these contingencies. Those with less favourable assets, whether natural or social,
will end up with less favourable results, even if they try as hard to become successful
as others who happen to have been born with great talents and in a favourable social
environment. Given that natural talent and our environment during early childhood are
things beyond our individual control, we can say that the inﬂuence of alea on the distribu-
tion of income compromises, if not outweighs, the inﬂuence of effort (agôn) in which we
put our talents to productive use.
For Caillois it is clear that agôn has priority above alea to bring about justice. Consider
the following passage:
Opinion is unanimous on indisputable evidence that work, merit, and competence, not the
capricious roll of dice, are the foundations necessary both to justice and to the proper evolution
of social life. As a result, work tends to be considered the only honorable source of income.
Inheriting wealth, the result of alea basic to birth, is debated, sometimes abolished, more often
submitted to important restrictions, in the interest of the general welfare. As for money won in
games or in a lottery, it ought in principle to constitute only a supplement or a luxury, which
augments the salary or wages regularly collected by the player in payment for his professional
activity. To draw [all or most of] one’s . . . subsistence through chance or gambling is regarded
by nearly everybody as suspect and immoral, if not dishonorable, and in any case, asocial.
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If agôn is more in line with justice than alea, then what is the place of the latter in our
society? Caillois attributes to alea an important psychological role, outside the domain of
justice, but necessary to make a meritocratic society acceptable to those who lose out:
He has been defeated in legal combat. To explain his failure, he cannot invoke injustice. The
conditions at the outset were the same for all. He can only blame his own inability. He can look
forward to nothing to compensate for his humiliation except the very unlikely reward of the
gratuitous favor of the fantastic powers of chance.
12
The loser can, so to speak, nourish a last hope for something for which all men are equal,
sheer fortune. In this sense, alea can be considered as the necessary complement to the
tendency of competence to eliminate the role of chance. The importance of a just balance
between agôn and alea is a topic elaborated in the fable of Michael Young.
13 In this fable he
sketches the rise of meritocracy and its probable decline in 2033. If income is completely
based on IQ, effort, and other criteria of merit, then the low income earners run the risk of
being stigmatized as inferior, as not belonging to the class of the talented. In coalition
with women from the upper classes longing for romance, they will then rebel against the
meritocratic system. The fable seems to suggest that the role of agôn (or merit) in striving
towards a just distribution of income must not be pushed too far.
Caillois’s description of the relation between justice, competence, and chance (agôn and
alea) reveals an embryonic theory of justice à la Rawls:
Inheritance continues to weigh upon everybody like a mortgage that cannot be paid off – the
laws of chance that reﬂect the continuity of nature and the inertia of society. The purpose of
legislation is to counterbalance these effects. Laws and constitutions therefore seek to establish a fair
balance between capacities and performance so that the inﬂuence of class can be checked and
ability can become truly dominant, as afﬁrmed by qualiﬁed judges, just as in sports contests.Roger Caillois, Games of Chance and the Superstar
37
However, it is obvious that the competitors are not equally placed to make a good start.
14
[Author’s italics]
In other words, if we want ability or competence to have an important or even predominant
place in a just distribution of income, then the analogy with play suggests that we must
understand equality of opportunity in the substantial instead of the formal sense, that is,
everybody should have real equal opportunities to make a good start. However, since
natural and social inequalities cannot be checked completely, the problem of justice broad-
ens and shifts to understanding how the institutional framework deals with the effects of
these inequalities.
Caillois’s assessment of the justice of the institutional framework of society shares
much in common with Rawls’s principles of justice, especially his second principle that
stipulates that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to
the greatest beneﬁt of the least advantaged and that they are attached to ofﬁces and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
15 These two
constitutent parts of Rawls’s second principle of “justice as fairness” are the so-called
difference principle and the principle of equal opportunity. Free competition for all positions
and ofﬁces in society on the basis of qualiﬁcations and talent is not enough. Such a formal
equality of opportunity only ensures that nobody is excluded from ofﬁces and jobs on
grounds based on race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. Formal equality of opportunity falls short
of fair equality of opportunity.
16 Fair equality of opportunity demands that society must
give more attention to the untalented, and this is what the difference principle is about:
No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in
society. . . Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the social system so
that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his
initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return.
17
The difference principle so neutralizes as far as possible the effects of the contingencies
of birth and upbringing.
18
Nevertheless, for at least two reasons agôn will never chase off alea from the scene.
First, even if fair equality of opportunity could be established, a radical contingency
remains: “. . . it is hard to imagine that an accident of birth or the position of one’s father
would be without effect upon the son’s career or would not automatically facilitate it.”
19
This is comparable to Rawls’s view that equality of opportunity can only be carried out
imperfectly
as long as some form of the family exists . . . It is impossible in practice to secure equal
chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed [the so-called “careers open to
talent”, I.G.], and therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also
mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself.
20
Secondly, as agôn gains ground, according to Caillois and in line with Michael Young,
the need for the complementary role of alea will rise. Not only those who are discouraged
by their lack of talent, but also those for whom all patience, effort, perseverance, and
talents were in vain, will want agôn to have the last word and hope in one way or another
to delight Fortuna in order to escape the chilly outcomes of agôn:Loek Groot
38
Under these conditions, alea again seems a necessary compensation for agôn, and its natural
complement. Those it dooms are entirely without hope in the future . . . It is the function of alea
to always hold out hope of such a miracle. That is why games of chance continue to prosper.
21
Precisely here the paradoxical status of superstars comes in.
The superstar as the epiphenomenon of the agôn-alea couple
The rise of the superstar is connected with the transition from primitive to rational societies:
“. . . in the founding of the great games (Olympic, Pythian, and Nemenic) and often in the
method of choosing city magistrates, agôn in association with alea takes the privileged
place in public life that mimicry-ilinx occupies in Dionysian societies.”
22 Because of the
“truly reciprocal relationship between a society and the games it likes to play” (for instance,
the great civilizing function of play in submitting oneself to the decisions of an impartial
referee), competition, competence, and impartial administration go hand in hand. During
the transition, the role of alea is at ﬁrst rather ambiguous. Caillois alleges that in the
transition from primitive societies (that is, those in which social cohesion is based on the
mimicry-ilinx couple) to rational societies, alea could have been an important intermediary.
23
Even ancient Greek culture, where competition played a very important role, bore the
marks of fatalism, like tyché (luck), moira (fate), and kairos (opportunity), which were only
gradually obscured in the modern Western societies by the growing inﬂuence of agôn. For
the Greeks, the selection of politicians by lot was a perfectly fair and egalitarian procedure,
all the more so because it was very effective in preventing favouritism and nepotism. The
problem for the ancient Greeks was not so much to choose between either agôn or alea,
but to decide in which situation which principle, agôn or alea, should have precedence:
It demonstrates that they are contrasting but complementary solutions to a unique problem –
that all start out equal. This may be accomplished by lot . . . provided they renounce any use of
their natural taleuts consent to a strictly passive attitude. Or, it may be achieved competitively if
they are required to use their abilities to the utmost, thus providing indisputable proof of their
excellence.
24
Now what is the place of superstars in a predominantly meritocratic society? Although
work and competition (activity and determination) and games of chance (passivity and
luck), or agôn and alea, are two separated poles, in the superstar they come together:
It is the reward of an extraordinary and mysterious convergence in which are compounded
one’s being magically gifted from infancy on, perseverance that no obstacle could discourage,
and the ultimate test presented by the precarious but decisive opportunity met and seized
without hesitation. The idol, for one, has visibly triumphed in an insidious, implacable, and
confused competition, where success must come quickly – for these resources, which the most
humble may have inherited and which may be the precarious lot of the poor, are timebound;
beauty fades, the voice cracks, muscles become ﬂabby, and joints stiffen.
25
The superstar unites both elements, because the superstar has extraordinary natural talent
augmented by an even more extraordinary perseverance and drive, who in competitionRoger Caillois, Games of Chance and the Superstar
39
with almost equally endowed and motivated rivals seeking an uncertain goal, succeeds in
reaching the number one position, superstar status. It is clear that the superstar beneﬁts
from a great dose of luck, chance, and coincidence. Those who attain superstar status are
primus inter pares, because small and relative differences are of decisive importance for
winning or losing by a hair’s breadth. In sports which are rank-order tournaments, the
differences between the champion and the runners-up are small. A change in the rules of
the game, for instance one instead of two services in tennis (or a change in the height of
the basket in basketball), will change the rank-order of the hundred top players. Players
now high on the list because of their strong service will lose their relative advantage and
others will take their place. Due to the arbitrary nature of the rules of the game (these are
just conventions like all gratuitous difﬁculties rubricated as ludus), superstars cannot
demand that the rules exactly favour their relative advantages (e.g. length and strength of
service). So the rules of the game, as issued by the sport associations, have an important
impact on the distribution of advantages among players.
The varying degree to which sports superstars are subject to agôn and alea can also
be illustrated by comparing the role of the referees in sports in North America and in
Europe. In the more popular sports in the US, notably baseball, basketball, and American
football, much more effort is spent in banning chance by means of intensive refereeing
than in the popular sports on the European continent. In soccer, which is by far the most
popular sport in Europe, there is just one referee (with two linesmen) in an enormous
ﬁeld with twenty-two players. The referee in soccer has to decide everything at a glance,
leaving much room for contestable decisions (that is, chance). In American sport, by
contrast, three or more referees are the rule rather than the exception. In general, one
might be tempted to conclude that the games which are popular in North America exhibit
a more important role of agôn at the expense of alea compared to the games popular in
Europe, where both good and bad luck have a much greater impact on the ﬁnal outcome
of the game (witness the fact that many soccer matches end in a score of 1–0).
 Perhaps the most important aspect of the role of the superstar in our society is the
identiﬁcation of the public with the star. Agôn and alea are both not only present for the
superstar (for the outcome of the game is unsettled and open beforehand), but also for
the public, by virtue of their identiﬁcation with the star. Due to this identiﬁcation, the
public is exempt from participation. This is marvellously expressed by Caillois as follows:
Every soldier may carry a marshal’s baton in his knapsack and be the most worthy to bear it,
except that he may never become a marshal commanding battalions of mere soldiers. Chance,
like merit, selects only a favored few. The majority remain frustrated. Everyone wants to be ﬁrst
and in law and justice has the right to be. However, each one knows or suspects that he will not
be, for the simple reason that by deﬁnition only one may be ﬁrst. He may therefore choose to
win indirectly, through identiﬁcation with someone else, which is the only way in which all can
triumph simultaneously without effort or chance or failure.
26
Are superstar incomes just?
I use the following criterion to speak of superstars, namely all those cases where only one
or a few among many others reaching for the same goal or position succeed in getting the
lion’s share of the added value in the market.
27 The best actors, directors, producers, popLoek Groot
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musicians, athletes, writers, software-producers, etc. can command annual incomes for
which the sky is the limit. With the increasing role of mass media in daily life, every year
new records are set. At least we can say that these incomes, however large, are obtained
in a legitimate way within a system of free competition, copyright protection, etc. To
answer the question of the appropriateness of superstar incomes I shall enumerate some
factors mentioned by Caillois.
28 First, there is the role of the public: “The inordinate glory
of the idol is a continuous witness to the possibility of a triumph which has already been
of some beneﬁt to, and which to some extent is due to, those who worship the hero”.
29 In
this respect, one may wonder whether the material reward of the superstar is a necessary
ingredient (for the glory of the star) for the identiﬁcation of the public with the star, or
whether it is the excellence or the private life of the star which is of more importance. It
is also unclear to what extent the star is motivated by intrinsic values (the attractiveness
of the activity in which he employs his talents) or extrinsic values (the lure of money) of
his activity. In any case, both questions concern psychological aspects, not justice.
To characterize superstars’ rewards Caillois uses the term “disguised lotteries”, as
opposed to ordinary lotteries:
In fact, when the general expenses of administration are deducted, the seemingly dispropor-
tionate proﬁt is exactly proportionate to the amount of risk played by each player. A more
remarkable modern innovation consists of what I shall arbitrarily call disguised lotteries – i.e.
those not requiring money to be risked and seeming to reward talent, learning, ingenuity, or any
other type of merit, thus naturally escaping general notice or legal sanction. Some grand prizes
of a literary character may truly bring fortune and glory to a writer, at least for several years.
These contests stimulate thousands of others that are of little signiﬁcance but which somehow
trade upon the prestige of the more important competition.
30
In opposition to Caillois, I believe that the thousands of others participating in the
same common practice as the celebrated writer are very important for the common good
realized (in literature, for example) in those practices. As indicated above, superstars can
only emerge by making use of and participating in existing practices. The superstar is just
the primus inter pares who has reached the level of excellence in the activity involved,
in competition with many others. In other words, there is a “communitarian” aspect
involved. It is not only that movie stars make great movies, but that they can only emerge
when there is a tradition, culture, and technology of movie-making., Someone who has a
talent for playing three-dimensional billiards in space will have to wait for some time.
Thirdly, most of the rules of the game are rather arbitrary (recall the “gratuitous
difﬁculty” that ludus imposes on paidia, as we showed earlier). No player has an a-priori
right that the rules of the game are such that he or she will turn out to be the winner.
Finally, as already noted above, there is a high degree of arbitrariness, luck, and chance
involved in the genesis of a superstar: the role of natural talents, universal recognition of
that particular individual rather than another; in short, the fact that it is he, rather than
anybody else, is the star.
31 The question of justice concerns not only who rakes in the
superstar income, but also why the rewards have to be concentrated at the top, and not
top-down to all the participants or contributors to the activity involved. For example, at
universities the distribution is such that top-down every participant is paid a salary and
not only the (potential) Nobel prize-winners. The excellence of an activity (research) isRoger Caillois, Games of Chance and the Superstar
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only possible in a wetting with more actors (researchers, students), that is, if there is a
whole pyramid of competitions at all levels (pre-university education).
Caillois’s observation of the strong connection between agôn and justice, applied to
superstars, in so far as their incomes are the result of a special kind of game of chance
(“a disguised lottery”), indicates they are unjust. However, we also saw that superstar
incomes play an important psychological role. Through identiﬁcation of the public with
the star it functions as a psychologically compensating mechanism in a society run on
predominantly meritocratic principles. The tension between these two types of contradic-
tion is not resolved by Caillois.
32 For Rawls, “The premiums earned by scarce natural
talents . . . are to cover the costs of training and to encourage the efforts of learning, as
well as to direct ability to where it best furthers the common interest.”
33 This would
certainly not justify superstar incomes as high as those experienced today.
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